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THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL SECTOR POLICIES
ON NIGERIA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
By
Mike I. Obadan, Ph.D.*
1.

INTRODUCTION

The Nigerian economy is open. and it operates within the world capitalist system.
The country's external sector policies relating to exports_and imports of goods and
services. and capital are not only conditioned by domestic factors but also by external
developments including external shocks which may have their origin from the goods
and/or capital market. The shocks which may have adverse or positive effects include
export shocks. import shocks. exchange rate and trade shocks, terms of trade shocks and
interest rate shocks. A country·s external sector policies. in terms of trade and
commercil!I policy instruments, are largely conditioned by the need to respond to the
various shocks through financing and/or adjustment.
The major trade and commercial policy instruments used at different times in
Nigeria are:
Fiscal Policy - tariffs on imports:·export taxes:
Di.rector control measures- importregttlations.quotas. bans and import licensing:
Foreign exchange controls which include regulations on capital transfers, restriction
on income transfers. basic travel allowance (BTA). etc. ;
Export promotion measures and'incentives. and export prohibitions
Exchange rate policy
Others include Advanced Deposit on Imports. Pre-shipment lmport Supervis ion
and Deferred Payments on Impo1ts.
However. the most important of the trade and commercial policy instruments has
been tariff. However. since the structural adjustment programme (SAP) in 1986. the
exchange rate instrument and export promotion have also been very prominent. For the
purpose of this paper. the various external sector policies will be discussed under the
following:
Import Policies
* Prof. M. I. Obadu11 is the Direcror-General , Natio11al Ce111re for Eco11omic Mu11age111e111 u11d
Ad111i11istratio11, Ibadan.
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Export Policies
Exchange Rate Policy and Foreign Exchange Management Policies
Balance of Payments Policies
External Debt Management Policies
These will be preceded by a brief discussion of the international environment
under which external sector policies are pursued.
2.

IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Over the years, the Nigerian economy, like other developing economies, has
operated within a hostile international environment. Features of this environment
include worsening terms of trade, increasing international protectionism and external
debt burden. There has been the problem of weak market for primary commodities,
reflected in observed secular decline in the prices of non-oil exports, arising from excess
supplies of the commodities. The dollar price index of Nigeria's agricultural commodity
exports declined by an annual average of 70 per cent between 1988 and 1992 ( 1985 =
100). However, some improvement occurred thereafter. The reduced demand for
primary products by the industrialized countries as a result of very high rate of
technological development, coupled with the decline in the rate of growth of their
economies, has tended to result in their reduced demand for primary commodity
exports. Even where these conditions are not present, the protectionist meas~es of the
industrializ.ed countries have constrained the accessibility of Nigeria's exports to their
domestic markets. The protective measures have particularly been inhibitive to the
growth of manufactured exports. The increase in protectionism in the developed
countries in recent years has been quite significant (Anjara, et al; 1985). Increased
r..estrictive policies on imports in the industrialized countries, in the fonn of tariff and
non tariff barriers, have continued to hamper the efforts of developing countries at
specializing in production in accordance with their comparative advantage.
The prices of crude oil, upon which Nigeria depends for over 95 per cent for foreign
exchange earnings, have also been unstable as can be seen from table 1. Over the 198095 p•eriod, the prices were lowest in 1986, 1988 and 1994. The price of Nigeria's crude
oil fell continuously from $19.8 per barrel in December 1992 to $13.6 in December
1993, with destabilising effect on the balance of payments and government finances.
These prices as well as the production levels are determined exogenously within the
framework of the Organization of P~troleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The
volatility of the world oil market adversely affects the nation's foreign exchange
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receipts and government domestic revenue. While the prices of export commodities in
the world market have been low. the prices of Nigeria's imports have been quite high.
thereby worsening the terms of trade. The fact that the price of c rude oil exports is
inte rnationally determined through OPEC makes the terms of trade facing Nigeria more
precarious. Nigeria's international terms of trade ( 1985 = 100) declined from 222.8 in
198 1 to 9 1.6 in 1986 and 76.6 in 1988. Nigeria has nor on ly had to contend w ith secular
declines in the terms of trade and increasing protectionism. bur also a very heavy
external debt burden which became pronounced since the early eighties. This debt
burden has manifested in very heavy an worrisome debt serv ice payments. By spending
a large part of foreign exchange receipts on debt servicing. a country has very little
available for supporting investment in the domestic economy. The increased de bt
burden is thus detrimental to growth and development of the domestic economy.

3.

IMPORT POLICIES

Tariffs. import regulations and prohibitions, and import pre-shipment supervis ion
have been the most prominent import policy instruments for sometime now. These have,
however, been implemented since the structural adjustment programme within the
framework of trade liberalization. They are applied on non-discriminatory basis to
imports from all countries.

3.1 TARIFF POLICY BEFORE SAP
Nigeria· s tariff policy served purely the purposes ofraising revenue for government
up to 1958 and from then on it also served as an instrument for the dual objective of
solving balance of payments problems and providing a protective wall behind which
domestic industry could grow. Apart from aiming to promote rapid industrial growth in
the context of import substitution. tariff has also been used to stimulate the expansion
of agricultural production. Tariff policy was geared towards providing incentives to
domestic producers of importable goods to increase production. Besides. the reduc tion
in the level of price inflation was also a target of tariff policy.
The achievement of the various tariff objectives required the upward o r downward
adjustment of tariff rate. and movement of goods from Open General License to specific
Import License, and vice versa. Specifically. in l 983 and 1984 the customs and excise
tariffs were reformed to provide effective protection for local industries; to reduce the
level of unemployment and to generate more revenue from the non-oil sector. In 1984
the range of import duties was reduced from between zero and 500% to between 5 and
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200% and this was to remain in force for a minimum of three years. The general
concessionary rates of duty under which zero duty was granted to some manufacturers
was abolished. In order to encourage investment in agriculture and increase local
production of food and agricultural raw materials. duties on machinery and equipment
for exclusive use in agriculture were abolished while duties on selected impo11ed
agricultural products were raised. In 1985. the customs and excise tariff~ of 1984 was
retained. However, a new measure of Advanced Payment of Custom duty was introduced.
In sum, up to the time the SAP was introduced the tariff policy instrument was
geared toward the accomplishment of numerous objectives. some of which tended to
conflict. Examples being instances where tariff rates were reduced on certain imported
consumer goods to combat inflation, while at the same time resulting in reduced
protection to local industries. Therefore. the erratic use of import tariffs as a weapon in
the fight against the increasingly acute problem of inflation prevented the evolution of
a coherent tariff policy for the protection of domestic manufacturing industries.
3.2 TARIFF POLICY SINCE SAP
Tariff policy under SAP has been conducted within the framework of trade
liberation which involved market-determination of exchange rates: abolition of import
licenses and export taxes as well as the Commodity Boards. etc. An interim review of
the Customs and Excise Tariff took effect from September. 1986. It was expected to
protect local industries against undue competition from imports, create more employment,
control inflation and encourage the utilization of local raw materials by industries. It
seemed. however, that the tariffreform was haphazardly done, as it resulted in numerous
problems and inconsistencies. The reform produced devastating consequences and
protests from industries. Considered with the very high foreign exchange cost of
production. the effect of the tariff structure tended to strangulate local industries and
forestall the revival of dormant ones.
In the light of the defects of the interim review of the Customs and Excise Tariff.
a more comprehensive tariff structure was adopted in 1988. Under this structure. import
an excise duty rates were to last for a period of seven years to provide industrialists with
a longer time horizon to make decisions. The essence of the new tariff structure was to
provide a higher degree of protection for local industries. Preliminary analys is of the
level of nominal protection by the Policy Analysis Department (PAD) of the Federal
Ministry of Industries showed the trend of protection in the economy to be downwards
reflecting the efforts to discourage the production of luxury goods and to minimise the
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impact of the price effect of protection on non-essential consumer goods category.
Nevertheless. although the new tariff structure was a significant improvement
over the interim Customs and Excise Tariff Review. it reflected certain inconsistencies
which led to subsequent amendments. Indeed, the goals of simplicity, transparency,
stability and predictability which the 1988-94 tariff regime promised were compromised
by recurring amendments over the period such that by the end of 1994, over 20 per cent
of the tariff codes had been amended, and the structure of the tariffs had become
distorted and complex, sending conflicting signals to investors (Kalegha, 1996). By
1994, tariff rates ranged between 0 and 300 per cent, and there was wide dispersion in
nominal protection rates between and within sector. Furthermore, most of the tariff
amendments did not satisfy certain interest groups. and government had to respond to
protests on the tariff structure in the first half of 1989 by providing some temporary
relief measures aimed at increasing capacity utilisation in some industries. The
measures. however, did not have the desired ameliorating effect on prices. A fundamental
problem which has tended to militate against the effectiveness of the tariff structure is
the depreciation of the naira. This has had the implication of eroding the level of
protection and hence engendering tariff protests.
A new Customs and Excise Tariff Schedule was promulgated early in 1995 to last
till the year 2001. Essentially, the new tariff regime in-comparison with the previous one
reveals the following:
lower average nominal protection rates (33.0per cent in 1994 compared to 24.3 per
cent for 1995-1998);
a reduced tariff peak (from 300 per cent in 1994 to 150 per cent in 1995/96 and 100
per cent thereafter)
reduced dispersion in rates;
shorter import-and export prohibition lists; and
a revised excise list.
Table 2 illustrates the average tariff rates. It should be noted, however, that
effective from 1st July. 1995 when government granted an across-the-board 35 per cent
discount on import duties payable, in consideration of the fact that duties are based on
the market determined autonomous exchange rate, the effective tariff rate for 1995-98
has dropped from 24.3 per cent to 15.8 per cent (Kalegha, 1996).
Considering the impact of tariff policies on production, this has not been much. As
Iyo ha ( 1996) observed for agriculture. ··the level of agricultural growth expected during
the period, 1988-1994 was not realized. Food self-sufficiency has also been elusive".
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A major explanation for the lower-than-expected growth of the agricultural sector
seems to be the very rapid increase in the costs of inputs arising mainly from supply
rigidities and the depreciating naira. Thus, tariff incentives per se may not be enough.
An enabling environment to allow adequate response to incentives is crucial. Similarly,
the impact of tariff policy on industrial production has been limited. With nearly four
decades of import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy. Nigeria is still in the first
phase of ISi - production of consumer goods. Also, the contribution of manufacturing
to the GDP is still low. being less than 10 per cent, besides, the industrial sector has
continued to exhibit low capacity utilization - less than 30 per cent in 1995. Some of
these problems are, however, not unconnected with the general framework of trade
liberalization within which external sector policies have been implemented.
3.3 TRADE LIBERALIZATION
One of the hallmarks of the SAP was trade liheralisation which entailed import
liberalisation , market determination of exchange rates, free marketing of export
commodities, etc. For a developing economy, trade policy should have features of both
liberalization and protection. In this regard, a development-oriented trade policy aimed
at building up supply capacity should be an integral part of industrial development
strategy. Accordingly, it may comprise the liberalization of trade in some goods, and it
may at the same time strengthen. or loosen, the degree of protectionism in others.
However. the unguarded liberalisation of trade during SAP, especially in the early
phases, has not been helpful to the growth of local industries. It encouraged the
importation and dumping of subsidized goods from the developed countries to the
detrin1ent of local industries. Essentially. the trade liberalisation policy had a number
of glaring weaknesses, one of which was the overemphasis on exchange rate alignment
without due cognisance of the adverse effects on productivity. It is sometimes forgotten
that the orthodox prescriptions on trade liberalization neglect the importance of longrun development of supply capacity and the limitations of market forces in building up
such capacity. Furthermore, the extensive trade liberalization worked against exports
of manufactures adversely affected export earnings from primary commodities.
Manufactured exports were handicapped as existing and potential export industries
could not access scarce imported inputs while imports of other goods, including all
kinds ofluxury items, tended to flourish. In addition, devaluation has raised manufacturing
costs because of its high import intensity. Essentially. trade liberalization has not lived
up to expectation because of various socio-economic, structural and external factors,
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the design of policy reform programmes generally, and insufficient attention to
structural conditions. Therefore, trade policy should aim at the long-run development
of supply capacity and this cannot be left for market forces alone. Some form of
government intervention is required to build up such capacity. This, in Nigeria' s
context. requires a comprehensive review of the structure of imports to reflect the
objectives of industrial and economic development.

3.4 IMPORT REGULATIONS AND CONTROL
Before the SAP, direct control measures were generally aimed at regulating the
volume of imports with a view to protecting the balance of payments, local industries
and/or controlling inflation. Exchange control measures were either aimed at controlling
the rate of outflow of foreign exchange and/or keeping external reserves at an 'adequate
level' or diversifying them. The implementation of the various measures followed a
pattern of stricter application in crisis situations, when the BOP and/or external reserves
position, was precarious. When it was felt that there were significant improvements, the
government embarked on a liberalization policy by reducing import and export taxes
and liberalizing administrative and exchange controls. Apart from direct and exchange
control measures , Nigeria, in April 1992, introduced the compulsory advance deposit
on imports as a form of import control. Under the scheme, importers were required to
make deposits of funds ranging from 25 per cent for raw materials and spare parts
imports to 250 per cent for motor cars. The funds were to be collected by the authorised
dealers before letters of credit could be opened for the customers. The scheme was,
however. abolished in 1984.
The import pre-shipment supervision scheme has also been in use for quite
sometime. It was first introduced in January, 1979 to ensure the quality of imports and
forestall a number of foreign exchange malpractices which resulted in dwindling
foreign exchange reserves. Effective from 1st April. 1996, the revised guidelines for
importation into Nigeria strengthened the role of the Pre-Shipment Inspection Agents
by requiring all goods regardless of value or mode of carriage to be subject to inspection
and issuance of a clean report of findings. Duty assessment and the issuance of Import
Duty Report (IDRs) are to be exclusively carried out by the Inspection Agents.
Import prohibition or ban has been widely used as a tool of commercial policy in
the country since independence. Nigeria operates 2 import prohibition lists known as
schedules 3 and 4 of the tariff book. Schedule 3 lists products which were importprohibited for trade purposes while schedule 4 lists products which are absolutely
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prohibited for reasons of national security, public health safety or morality. As at the end
of 1994, the Import Prohibition (Trade) List covered some 920 tariff items at the level
of the 8-digit HS code. However, the 1994 tariff review exercise resulted in the
unbanning of 222 tariff items, while 3 new products were prohibited (Kalegha, 1996).
Table 3 shows the coverage of import prohibition as at 1996.
Import prohibition, no doubt, has its justification in terms of meeting the objectives
of promoting self-sufficiency, especially food self-sufficiency in the case of most agroallied products; infant industry protection; forced industry restructuring (e.g. ban on
wheat and malted barley); and promotion of political/social/moral objectives by
discouraging importation of luxury or socially undesirable products (e.g. gaming
machines). However, the effectiveness of import prohibition is in doubt and often less
than successful as evidenced by the ready availability of most prohibited products in the
markets, either through the illegal avenue of smuggling or the legal one of "special
approvals to import". Besides. import prohibition denies the government of muchneeded revenue apart from being ineffective in offering protection to domestic producers
in agriculture and industry, and in forcing industrial restructuring. Furthermore, import
prohibition policy removes the incentive for domestic producers to operate efficiently
and produce high quality commodities at internationally competitive prices. Since
import prohibition tends to be ineffective and wasteful, tariffs can be relied upon to
achieve the objectives of protection, reducing consumption and boosting government
revenue.

EXPORT POLICIES
Nigeria's export policies relate to promotion. expansion and diversification in
order to reduce the economy's over-dependence on crude oil exports. They also relate
to issues of regulation and control in terms of taxes and prohibitions.
4.

4.1 EXPORT PROMOTION STRATEGIES AND POLICIES
The overall objective of export promotion before SAP was largely to boost foreign
exchange earnings. Promotion activities were concentrated mainly on primary
commodities including agricultural and mineral products. however, export promotion
policies did not have much linkage with industrial policy, more especially as the ImportSubstitution policy (I-S) was pursued without any well-defined objective of exportation
of industrial products. To worsen matters, as soon as the government began to realise
t_h e need for non-oil export expansion and diversification, crude oil production and
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export assumed prominence in the economy. consequent! y, the policy of non-oil export
promotion was never taken seriously even though there were clear statements of
intentions to diversify the export structure and expand the earnings. The focus on crude
oil exploitation and import-substitution encouraged the sustenance of anti-export bias
policies such as over-valued exchange rates. it was. therefore. not too sutprising thlit
before the introduction of the SAP in 1986, Nigeria' s non-oil exports remained low. ahd
largely undiversified.
Since the SAP the main goal of the government's export policy has been the active
promotion of non-oil exports with a view to enhancing foreign exchange receipts from
such exports, diversifying the sources of foreign exchange earnings. and reducing the
excessive dependence of the economy on oil as the major source of revenue.
To this end, non-oil exports were to be promoted with a package of incentives spelt
out in the 1986 Federal budget to aid production for export. The incentives were later
given legal force and embodied in the Export (incentives and Miscellaneous Provision)
Decree No. 18 of July 1986). The structural adjustment programme document stressed
the government's commitment to the promotion of non-oil exports . It stated that:
although, it is realised that the initial base of the non-oil exports has
shrunk considerably during the past decade, the government believes
that the correction of cost-price distortions through a realistic exchange
rate, combined with other positive export incentives and institutional
reforms, should make it possible for Nigeria to earn at least $1 billion
for non-oil exports by the end of the present decade.
To accomplish the non-oil export objectives of foreign exchange expansion. and
product and market diversification, the government moved in the direction of pursuing
a more aggressive, consistent and comprehensive export promotion programme. To this
end, it put in place a number of policy reforms and incentives. Two of these stand out
clearly, namely, the abolition of Commodity Boards and the consequent deregulation
of commodity prices, and the establishment of the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange
Market (SFEM) to ensure realistic prices for agricultural products.
In addition to the liberal policy regime and trade reforms, provisions were made
for exporters to benefit from very generous measures and incentives, among which are:
(a) The duty draw-back scheme. In 1991 the manufacturing-in-bond scheme was
introduced.
( b) Refund of excise duty paid on export manufacturing.
(c) Retention by rton-oil exporters of 100 Jkr cerlt of ex~ort proceeds in foreign
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currency domiciliary account.
(d) Zenotax on interest earned on export loans.
(e) Accelerated tax depreciation and capital allowance for manufactured exports.
(f) Supplementary allowance in favour of pioneer compan ies
(g) Abolition of export licenses.
(h) Liberalization and simplification of export procedures and documentation.
(i) Cash grants to exporters based on annual perfom1ance.
U) Foreign input facility
(k) Rediscounting and Refinancing Facility (RRF).
(l) ADB-assisted Export Stimulation Loan - disbursed to small and medium-scale
enterprises manufacturing for export.
(m) Export Development Fund - to private exporters to defray part of their export
promotion activities.
(n) Export Expansion Fund - to provide cash inducement for exporters who export a
minimum of N50,000 worth of manufactured or semi-manufactured products.
(o) Export Adjustment Scheme Fund - to provide supplementary export subsidy for
high cost of production.
(p) Establishment ofthe Nigerian Export-Import Bank (NEXIM) and Export Processing
Zone (EPZ).
In the 1996 budget statement additional incentives and measures were slept out for
implementation (see 1996 Federal Budget).
Thus, a lot has been done in terms of providing incentives to boost non-oil exports.
The various export measures and package of incentives are very attractive and laudable.
They, no doubt, point to Government's commitment to the promotion of non-oil
exports. A good number of the measures have been implemented in varying degrees.
However, in the implementation of the incentives the point appeared to have been
forgotten to the effect that the provision of generous export incentives is a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for an effective non-oil export drive. The export drive under
SAP appeared to have been predicated on the assumption that the country has exportable
surpluses of agricultural and manufactured goods. This has, however, turned out to be
incorrect in the light of the persistently low capacity utilisation of manufacturing
industries and-long gestation periods and low short-run elasticities of supply associated
with tree crops such as cocoa, rubber and oil palm.
There is the use of the agricultural sec;tor as a base and, consequently. most of the
incentives encourage the exportation of primary products to the same old Euro-
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American market with all its well-known shortcomings. Even then, adequate incentives,
by way of credit and input subsidies, were not given in any significant measures to
agricultural producers. Rather, farmers were exposed to the fangs of the·market forces
of demand and supply. Not least was the apparently counter-productive role of some
policy reforms, particularly exchange rate Alignment. Given the input-import dependence
of the country's production structure, the net effect of naira depreciation in the foreign
exchange market was to sharply increase domestic cost of production.
It is therefore, hardly surprising that the non-oil export sector has so far performed
very much below expectation. the SAP measures and incentives could not achieve the
desired objective of substantial growth of non-oil export proceeds. Available statistics
show that qoth the quantity and value of non-oil exports increased immediately after the
introduction ofthe SAP incentives. The quantity of major agricultural export commodities
increased from 131.1 million tonnes in 1985 to 242.8 million tonnes in 1986 and 497 .8
million tonnes in 1988. Thereafter, it declined continuously to 296.1 million tonnes in
1991, increased to 422.9 million tonnes in 1992 and declined to 263.2 million tonnes
in 1994.
In val\le terms, non-oil exports declined from $562.0 million in 1985 to $387.9
million in 1986. It, however, increased to $5372 million and $6089 million, in 1987 ar:id
1988, respeqtively. It declined to $399.1 million in 1989 and rose to $4720 million~
1991. The value· of $244.4 million for 1994 was dismal compared to the SAP target of
$10 billion by 1990. This trend has been due to declining demand an prices in the world
market. It has been observed, however, that the recorded foreign exchange earnings
from non-oil are understated to the extent of the unrecorded export trade across
Nigeria's borders.
The structure of total exports under SAP has remained basically the same as during
the period before SAP, such that the broad distinction between oil and non-oil expom
has not changed as a result of the policy measures . However, some notable changes have
occurred in the structure of non-oil exports. In this regard, new products are on the
export list. These include pineapples, cashew nuts, spices, fish, shrimps, etc. Nevertheless
the value of export of manufactured goods (including processed agricultural products)
has remained low, reflecting low industrial capacity utilisation. Overall, export of
primary commodities has continued to dominate non-oil export trade as in pre-SAP.
In the area of export market diversification, available information shows that the
objective has not been achieved.
What is clear from the foreign is that in spite of generous policies and incentives,
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Nigeria is yet to reach the promised land in terms of enhanced non-oil export earnings,
and export product and market diversification. Then, what went wrong? 111e fundamental
production/supply constraints with respect to both agricultural and manufactured
products have not been adequately addressed. However, there has been the problem of
self-defeating macroeconomic policies, e.g. continued depreciation of the naira and
high cost of funds occasioned by money market deregulation. of course, there are also
the problems of high cost of production, increasing domestic demand for tradables, poor
infrastructural facilities, and slow pace of development of the service sector. On the
external front are problems such as declining world market prices of major export
commodities, slow-down of the economies that are Nigeria ·s major markets, rising
protectionism, and break-down of most commodity Agreements.
Instability in world financial markets also works against the export expansion
objective. The significance of the external bottlenecks derives from the fact that with
their presence, export incentives tend to become necessary but insufficient condition to
increase export earnings. Indeed. exogenous factors could be strong enough to undermine
export incentives.

4.2 EXPORT PROHIBITION
This has frequently been used as a trade policy instrument in Nigeria. The rationale
for export prohibition has been the desire for food self-sufficiency (for primary food
products) or the desire to increase availability of raw materials for domestic industry
(for industrial inputs). Nigeria's Export Prohibition Orders date back to 1976. Since
then products have been added to or removed from the list. The current export
prohibition list has two categories of products as follows:
(a) Primary/Intermediate Food Products
{i)

Beans and bean products

(b) Industrial Inputs
(i)

Timber, rough or sawn

(ii) cassava Products

(ii) Hides and Skin (Raw)

(iii) Rice Products

(iii) Scrap Metals

(iv) Yam Products

(iv) Unprocessed rubber latex

(v) Maize

and rubber lumps
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One danger in using export prohibition as a trade policy instrument is that, in the
long run, it may constitute disincentive to increased domestic production of the affected
items as a result of their prices being held down. Another point is that as a result of
observed smuggling of export commodities, the objectives of the expon prohibition
tends to be negated. Therefore, export prohibition may need to be replaced by export
taxes which would reduce quantities and as well generate revenue for government.

5.

EXCHANGE RA TE POLICY AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE
MANAGEMENT

5.1

EXCHANGE RA TE POLICY

The main objectives of exchange rate policy before SAP were to equilibrate· the
balance of payments, preserve the value of the external reserves and maintain a stable
naira exchange rate. however, up to the time of SAP, Nigeria's exchange rate policy
tended to encourage the over-valuation of the naira as reflected in real exchange rate
appreciation, particularly in the 1970s. In this direction, the bilateral real exchange rate
appreciated by an average of 7.5 per cent while the real effective exchange rate (total
trade weighted) appreciated by an average of 7.3 per cent (Obadan. 1993). The real
appreciation of the exchange rate encouraged imports. discouraged non-oil exports and
helped to sustain the manufacturing sector's overdependence on imported inputs. The
real exchange rate appreciation thus severely eroded international competitiveness and
failed to achieve export diversification.
During the period of the structural adjustment programme exchange rate policy
objectives were pursued within the institutional framework of the Secondtier Foreign
Exchange Market (SFEM) which was established in September 1986. The market later
metamorphosed into the Foreign Exchange Market (FEM). then into the Inter-Bank
Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM) and Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market (AFEM).
The objectives of exchange rate policy under SAP can. to some extent. be said to reflect
the needs of medium/long-term balance of payments equilibrium. In this direction.
SFEM was predicated on the attainment of a realistic exchange rate of the naira through
the market forces of supply and demand for foreign exchange. It was then expected that
a realistic exchange rate should reduce excessive demand for foreign exchange.
especially for importation of finished goods and services. as well as e liminate the
prevailing distortions in the economy and stimulate non-oil exports. The ultimate
expectation was that all the exchange rate polic y and management actions would lead
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to an improvement in the balance of payments position anc ensure a large degree of
convertibility of the naira.
Since the introduction of the market-based exchange rate system in 1986, the naira
exchange rate has exhibited the feature of continuous instability reflecting the depreciation
of the naira in both the official and parallel markets for foreign exchange. Between
September 1986 and October 1993, the official exchange rate depreciated hy about 93.0
per cent with the exchange rate moving from Nl.55:$1.00 in September 1986 to
N21.89:$1.00 in 1994. If the autonomous market rate of N82.00:$1.00 in 1995 is
considered, then the rate of devaluation between 1986 and 1985 is 98.0 per cent. The
continued depreciation of the naira has been due to many factors, among which are: the
phenomenon of excess demand for foreign exchange in relation to supply; poor
performance of direct foreign investment and autonomous foreign exchange inflow;
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies; instability of the foreign exchange earnings
from crude oil, speculative activities and sharp practices of authorized dealers in the
foreign exchange market; and problem of fragile export base and in-built high importdependence of the economy.
The market-determined exchange rate policy has had profound impact-positive or
otherwise on different segments of the national economy. The problems associated with
exchange control and import licensing have been eliminated. The naira exchange rate
has shed its initial overvaluation. A system of prompt settlement of import bills has been
facilitated. Very importantly, the impact of the exchange rate on the domestic finances
of government has been phenomenal. The depreciation of the naira has resulted in
tremendous boosting of the domestic revenue of both Federal and State Governments.
For example, the size of federaly-collected revenue increased from N 14,600.1 million
in 1985 to N201 ,900 million in 1994. The corresponding federal government retained
revenue are N9.6 billion and N70.8 billion, respectively. Although the naira revenue
increased substantially, the size of the overall budget deficit also increased phenomenally,
largely because of the increased cost of running government, induced by depreciation.
Exchange rate policy has, nevertheless, served effectively as a budgeting instrument.
Another very important positive impact relates to the very substantial increases in
the farm gate prices, denominated in naira, of all exportable agricultural commodities.
Although the world market price (in foreign currency) of most of Nigeria 's scheduled
agricultural commodities has been downwards. the naira prices have generally moved
upwards due to the depreciation of the naira and liberal export policy. The increased
commodity prices resulted in improved nominal incomes of producers. But whether or
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not real incomes increased in the face of escalating inflation is another issue. Unlike the
pos itive effects on government naira revenue and producers' farm gate prices, exchange
rate policy has not had the expected impact on the balance of payments in terms of
enhanced non-oil export earnings. capital inflow and reduced capital outflows and
imports. Also, the objective of structural transformation of the economy remains largely
unfulfilled. Furthermore, the instability and incessant depreciation in the foreign
exchange value of the naira has resulted in:
sharp decline in people 's standard of living, real value of output and assets:
increased cost-push inflation - inflation rate rose from 5.4 per cent in December
1986 to 72.8 per cent in 1995;
difficulties in planning and making projections at macro and micro levels;
undermining of intemational competitiveness of non-oil exports
What does seem clear is that although the development objectives of the exchange
rate policy in the last decade were no doubt, in the right direction, achievements have
been less than satisfactory.
5.2 FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT POLICIES
Before the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria,
foreign exchange management was aimed at three but not mutually exclusive objectives;
conservation of available foreign exchange resources so as to check expenditure and
undue depletion of external reserves; ensuring adequacy of reserves consistent with
current and future international commitments; and perserving the value of external
reserves through appropriate portfolio diversification and optimal deployment into
strong currencies. Under SAP, the objectives of foreign exchange management hinged
on achieving a realistic exchange rate of the naira and in the process attaining other
objectives such as :
reduction of excessive demand for foreign exchange;
elimination of prevailing distortions in the economy;
stimulation of non-oil exports;
more effa:ient allocation of foreign exchange resources through substantial
reduction of fraudulent and wasteful transactions; and
improvement in the balance of payments position.
Before SAP, the major policy instruments of foreign exchange management were
trade and exchange control, and administrative control. however, the perceived shortcomings of exchange and trade controls led to their discontinuation and the adoption of
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market-based policy measures under the structura l adjustment programme in 1986. The
following policy instruments have featured in foreign exchange management in
Nigeria.
(i) Foreign Exchange Budgeting.
(ii) Demand Management Policies. These include fisca l and monetary policies.
market-determined exchange rate policy, and external debt management.
(iii) Market-determined Exchange Rate.
(iv) Supply-in.c reasing Policies. These include the various non-oil export promotion
measures and incentives. Also of note are the trade liberalisation measures abolition of export licensing and commodity boards.
(v) Pegging of Debt Service Payments.
A critical look at foreign exchange management in the past ten years suggests that
something has apparently been wrong with the management policy (Obadan, 1993a).
Not only did the search for a realistic exchange rate through the market approach prove
elusive, the naira exchange rate was persistently unstable with very wide amplitudes
vis-a-vis other currencies. Frivolous and speculative demand for foreign exchange
coupled with unauthorised foreign exchange transactions have been among factor
causing exchange rate instability. The export base has remained very narrow while
export receipts have remained low and unstable due largely to low commodity prices.
In spite of numerous incentives, the performance of the non-oil export sector has been
abysmal, in terms of foreign exchange earning. On the other hand. the dollar values of
merchandise imports have been upwards since the past four years. The overall balance
of payments position has also been weak while a large proportion of foreign exchange
earnings is still devoted to debt service payments, the various debt management
strategies notwithstanding. The external reserves position has remained critical such
that the reserves that were sufficient to cover 7.2 months of importS in 1986 could
finance only J.2 months in 1992 and 1.78 months in 1995 . More importantly, Obadan
(1993a) observed:
Official statistics show that the industrial sector has received the lion
share of foreign exchange allocation under FEM. The allocation
presumably financed the importation of raw material, machinery. spare
pans and CKD by the industrial sector. Yet. capacity utilisation has
been very low and worrisome, and contributions of the industrial sector
to GDP and employment are not impressive. This suggests that something
is definitely wrong somewhere. It is either that. contrary to the impression
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given by foreign exchange allocation statistics, manufacturing firms do
not actually receive the proportion of foreign exchange recorded for
them and/or the foreign exchange is sold at exhorbitant parallel market
rates, thus undermining production. In either case, the industrial sector
is short-changed.
Thus, since SAP it has been hard to discern the positive impact of foreign exchange
management policies on the real sectors of the economy.

5.3 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POLICIES

Jn the pre-SAP period and also during SAP one of the approaches adopted ro deal
with balance of payments problems was financing of payments disequilibria. In this
direction, balance of payments deficits were settled mainly by decumulating external
reserves while surpluses led to the building up of reserves as was the case during the oil
boom era. Since external reserves were sometimes depleted to very intolerable levels
a combination of measures were taken in addition to financing. These included trade and
exchange control measures, fiscal policies (changes in tariffs and export taxes),
expenditure-reducing policies, exchange rate alignment. monetary policy, and non-oil
expoo promotion measures.
Most of these policy measures before SAP were not implemented to provide longterm solutions to balance of payments problems. Rather, the direction of their
implementation reflected the strength and weakness of the balance of payments position
such that the measures were tightened in periods of deficits and relaxed when surpluses
were attained.
One of the key objective of SAP was to achieve balance of payments viability over
the adjustment period. In order to accomplish this goal, a number of measures were to
be implemented, among which were: market-determined realistic exchange rate ,
improved trade and payments liberalisation, and non-oil export promotion through the
provision of various incentives. A market-determined exchange rate system was
introduced in September 1986. The exchange rate was expected to affect the balance of
payments through exports and imports of goods and services, and capital inflows and
outflows. The realistic exchange rate policy was also expected to result in the
diversification of the ex port base by boosting non-oil exports and controlling the growth
of imports. As was shown before, available statistics, indicate that the dollar values of
non-oil exports have fallen far short of expectations. In the same way, the dollar values
of imports have shown upward trend in recent years. WhHe the capital account position
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has remained weak, the overall balance position has not been impressive either. Indeed.
during the period of SAP, the overall balance of payments and external reserves position
remained under pressure. The overall balance of payments. has been in persistent deficit
since J986 (see Table 6). The deficits have been due to the weakness of both the current
and capital accounts, but mainly the latter. The heavy debt amortization and interest
payments eroded the balance of trade/current account surpluses. And so the bane of the
balance of payments in recent years has been the external debt servicing.
The poor performance of the balance of payments is also due to the ineffectiveness
of monetary. exchange rate and fiscal policies in establishing balance of payments
equilibrium. The SAP period was characterised by the phenomenon of expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies. This resulted in signifiCfil1t_pressure on the exchange rate
and the balance of payments. Actual monetary variables deviated significantly from
targets and produced excess liquidity in the economy. Excessive fiscal deficits leading
to expansionary monetary policy, reflected in excessive growth in demand including
imports created the situation of macroeconomic instability, weak balance of payments
and erratic external reserves position.

6.

EXTERNAL DEBT BURDEN AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

6. 1 DEBT PROFILE
Nigeria's external debt problem became pronounced in the early 1980s when
numerous external loans were indiscriminately acquired, and foreign exchange earnings
plummeted consequent upon the collapse of prices in the international oil market.
The aggregate debt stock increased from $906 million in 1976 to $3.4 billion in
1977 and to $17.8 and $25.6 billion in 1983 and 1986. respective ly. As at December
1996, the debt stock stood at $32.6 billion (see Table 7). In explaining the rapid buildup of the debt stock it is important to recall the substantial role of imports of goods and
services and the rapid build-up of trade arrears from the early 1980s. Of course. there
were other important factors in the build-up. Among these was the fact that some
project-tied loans were contracted without consideration for economic viability. Other ·
were: utilisation of short-term loans sourced mainly from private markets to execute
projects of long-gestation periods: harsh borrowing terms reflecting high and floating
interest rates. short maturities of debt and shon grace periods: harsh international
financial system which makes the debt to grow uncontroll ably: indiscrimi nate and
uncontrolled borrowing abroad: mismanagement of borrowed funds: and inadequate
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implementation of debt management policies. Indeed , poor use of external loans has
been a major cause of the debt burden.
The major portion of the increase in the debt stock since SAP has been due to such
factors as new borrowings, rise in foreign interest rates, capitalization of unpaid interest
charges. and changes in the exchange rates of the vanous foreign currencies in which
Nigeria ·s foreign debt is denominated.
The servicing of the huge stock of debt, out of which the amount owed to the Paris
Club constitutes over 66.0 per cent. has continued to be very burdensome on the
economy. Indeed. as the 1996 federal budget statement acknowledged, the debt
servicing problems constitute a serious obstacle to the inflow of external resources into
the economy. In spite of the fact that government has been servicing the debt with $2.00
billion annually in the past 5 years. the accumulation of debt service arrears which is
being compounded with penalty interest has not permitted a reduction of the debt stock.
In 1996 debt service requirement was $4.271 billion . If debt service arrears of $ 11.280
billion up to December 1995 are added. then the total debt service requirements in 1996
would total $15.551 billion. This is staggering and requires substantial relief from the
creditors.
Obviously. the burden of amortization and interest payments has tended to drain
the nation 's resources and reduce the possible expenditure of resources on productive
ventures. The setting as ide of a dispropo1tionately high percentage of expo1t earnings
to meet debt service obligations means increasing inability of the country to pay for
other imports of goods and services vital for economic growth. This has been the case
in Nigeria. and to the extent that the external debt service increases the government
budget deficit financed mainly by the central bank, it poses a problem for the
achievement of macroeconomic objectives including price, exchange rate, and interest
rate stability as well as balance of payments viability. The implication of this, therefore,
is the need to reduce the debt-service ratio substantially in order to release foreign
exchange resources for funding economic recovery programmes as well as make the
contracting of new and burdensome loans unnecessary.

6.2 EXTERNAL DEBT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
Although. the debt management strategies and measures have varied from time to
time since the early 1980s. it would appear that an appropriate debt management
strategy was not in place. otherwise the debt problem would not have assumed
burdensome dimensions even when various relief measures have been in place. Indeed ,
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the I 996 Federal Government budget statement confirmed the very unsatisfactory
nature of past debt management strategies to the effect that many of the projects
financed by external loans are either uncompleted, or partially completed, and where
they have been comp leted, they are not functioning. Some ofthe projects are Ajaokuta
Steel Mill, Katsina Steel Rolling Mill, Jos Steel Rolling Mill, Delta Steel Mill. lwopin
Paper Mill, National Identity Card Project, etc. These projects have invariably not
contributed to the repayment of principal and interest on loans. Neither has any of the
expected benefits materialised. The economy thus loses on all sides. Obviously, most
of the elements of effective debt management were lacking in Nigeria's efforts.
The Government has, over the years adopted a number of strategies and measures
to deal with the debt problem. They include:
embargo on new loans;
directives to state governments to restrict their external borrowing to the barest
minimum;
limit on debt service payments - pegging of the debt service ratio at 30 percent of
export earnings.
debt restructuring entailing refinancing of trade arrears, rescheduling. debt buyback, collaterisation and new money options;
debt conversion programme; and
adoption of a new external borrowing policy.
The embargo on new loans and directives to state governments to restrict their
borrowings to the barest minimum have not been particularly effective as indiscriminate
quests for external loans have not abated. Although rescheduling has conferred shortterm relief on debt service obligations, the debt overhang has, however, hardly abated
as the debt stock has continued to increase significantly. The relief conferred by
rescheduling has not only been temporary but inadequate, apart.from-its various costs.
The rescheduling involve the compounding of principal and interest i the consolidation
period. besides. there is no provision for interest cancellations.and so any time there is
a default on interest payments, such pa~nts are capitalised. overall, the terms of the
rescheduling, particularly of the Paris club debt, have worsened the debt situation.
The debt conversion programme (DCP) which was established in 1988 had as one
of its objectives the improvement of Nigeria' s external debt position by reducing the
stock of outstanding external debt in order to alleviate the debt service burden. After
seven years in operation, the impact of the DCP on the debt stock has been minimal.
From inception in 1988 to 1994 only $730.2 million of debt was redeemed. The total
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discount received was $381.4 million while the transaction commission stood at $9.97
million. The sectoral disbursements of redeemed debt show that 41. 7 per cent went to
agriculture and manufacturing. Besides, the inflationary impJ ications of the conversion
can be quite destabilizing. [Indeed, the programme had to be suspended temporarily in
1990 and 199 1 because of the inflationary implications !. More importantly. the DCP
has the weakness that in the long-run the fundamental external payments and foreign
e xchange problem wilu-emain or even be exacerbated because what was saved in terms
of debt service would then be paid in the form of repatriation of profit, dividend . capital
and personal emolument.
A very significant aspect of the debt management that could have checked the
growth of external debt and increase foreign exchange earnings was the · New External
borrowing Policy ' released in 1988. This was a pragmatic and all-embracing plan which
outlined strategies for increasing foreign exchange earnings so as to reduce the need for
external borrowing; set out detailed criteria for external borrowing: outlined the
mechanism for servicing external debts of the public and private sectors: and outlined
the roles and responsibilities of the various tiers of government and private sector in the
management of external debts. The problem. however. is that the ' New Borrowing
Policy·, desirable as it is, had not been taken seriously by the various economic agents
that were expected implement it. It will , therefore, be desirable that an effective external
debt management strategy should take cognisance of the 'New External Borrowing
Policy'. Other desirable elements of such a strategy include a good estimate of foreign
financial requirements and the sources of funds, a proper evaluation of the projects to
be financed with external loans, prope r monitoring and documentation of the debt
profile, financial prudence at the domestic level and avoidance of borrowing to finance
consumption.
It is desirable to explore genuine debt relief measures that will enable the country
to grow out of debt. These include:
reduction/cancellation of interest payments and actual cancellation of significant
proportion of the debts. This can be achieved within the framework of existing
international relief proposals/terms;
accompaniment of rescheduling with other debt relief measures. e.g. interest rate
reduction, and debt cancellation; and
debt - buy back.
More importantly, negotiations for debt relief should de-emphas ise the traditional
rescheduling option in view of its inadequacies. Debt relief should be sought within the
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Trinidad and Tobago, and Naples Terms. To pave the way forthis ,effortshould be made
for the country to reach agreement with the IMF/World Bank on the Medium-Term
Economic Programme (MTP) as this is a pre-condition for meaningful debt negotiations/
relief. The improving political environment should facilitate the acceptance of the
MTP. Also, a concerted effort is required of the international creditors to assist the
country by way of a comprehensive and concessional debt and debt service reduction
package. Opportunities for debt buy-back should be explored while a faithful
implementation of the New External borrowing Policy will bring a substantial relief in
the medium/long-term.

7.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Over the years, particularly since the early 1980s, the Nigerian economy has
operated within a hostile international environment. characterised b y worsening terms
of trade, increasing international protectionism, export pessimism, weak market for
primary commodities, and external debt burden. The structural weakness in Nigeria's
foreign trade, reflecting excessive dependence on crude oil exports and imports of
capital goods and raw materials, has also not been helpful as it subject' s the economy
to debilitating external shocks. External sector policies are thus conditioned by both
internal and external developments .
One of the country ' s major external sector policies is the tariff policy. This has
been conducted since the SAP within the framework of trade liberalisation. Tariff policy
has been aimed at raising revenue for government, promoting rapid industrialisation
and balance of payments equilibrium. However, before SAP the sporadic and erratic use
of import tariffs as an anti-inflation weapon prevented the evolution of a coherent tariff
policy for the protection of domestic industries. Even since SAP when two major tariff
reviews have taken place the impact of tariff policies on industrial and agricultural
production has not been much. This situation might not be unconnected with the
framework of trade liberalisation which tended to neglect the need for enhancing
productivity and placed too much emphasis on exchangerate alignment. The liberalisation
policy encouraged the importation and dumping of subsidized goods. Therefore, tariff
policy should aim at long-run developing of supply capacity as an integral part of
industrial development strategy. It should have features of both trade liberalisation and
protection.
In view of the weaknesses of the instrument of import prohibition, tariffs can be
considered in its place to achieve the objectives of protection, curbing consumption. and
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boosting government revenue.
Over the past decade a lot of incentives have been provided and measures taken
to boost non-oil exports. The measures have, so far, not succeeded in boosting non-oil
export earnings nor diversifying the export structure. for the incentives and measures
to make the desired impact the fundamental production/supply constraints with respect
to both agricultural and industrial products need to be addressed. The issue of selfdefeating macroeconomic policies need to be reviewed. So also are other factors
contributing to high cost of production.
Export prohibition has also featured prominently as an instrument of trade policy.
Th current export prohibition list has nine products. Although export prohibition has its
own justification, it may in the long-run constitute disincentive to increased domestic
production of the affected items. Therefore, export prohibition may need to be replaced
by export taxes which would reduce quantities and as well generate revenue for
government.
The depreciation of the naira has resulted in tremendous boosting of Federal and
State Government finances , producers' farm gate prices and nominal incomes have also
increases substantially. But the adverse effects of the depreciation on living conditions
and price stability has been devastating.
Foreign exchange management policies over the past ten years have not
accomplished their objective of a realistic exchange rate. balance ofpayments equilibriwn
and industrial transformation. Capacity utilisation of manufacturing enterprises has
remained low in spite of statistics pointing to industry having received the lion 's share
of foreign exchange resources. Apart from measures to boost foreign exchange supply,
the structure of imports has to be rationalized to eliminate frivolous importation.
The external sector policies of the structural adjustment programme - trade and
payments liberalization, market-determined exchange rate, and export promotion have
proved ineffective in improving the external position. The overall balance of payments
and external reservers have remained under pressure as the bane of the balance of
payments in recent years remain the heavy resource outflow in respect of external debt
servicing. for it to improve. focus will have to be on the vigorous promotion of non-oil
exports including services, the management of imports and external debt.
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TABLE 1:
INTERNATIONAL OIL PRICE, 1980 • 95 (BONNY LIGHT)

Index I985 = 100

Year

US$ per Barrel

1980

35.8

129.2

1981

38.0

137.2

1982

35.5

128.2

1983

30.0

108.3

1984

28.0

101.1

1985

27.7

100.0

1986

14.9

53.8

1987

18.5

66.8

1988

15.0

54.2

1989

18.4

66.4

1990

24.1

87.0

1991

20.1

72.6

1992

19.8

71.5

1993

17.5

63.2

1994

16.2

58.5

1995

17.3

62.5

Source: CemntJ Bank of Nigeria. Nigeria: Major Economjc and Financial Indjcators;

Annual Report, 19<2s,

Obadan

TABLE2
AVERAGETARIFF RATES, 1938-2001

1988-1994 Tariffs

1995-2001 Tariffs

1988

1994

1995-1998

1999-2001

33.6

33.0

24.3

26.0

Agriculture

31.0

23.l

22.9

24.7

Mining

13.5

16.l

14.5

14.7

Manufacturing

33.3

34.0

24.6

26.4

of which:
Consumer Goods

53.5

47.7

49.l

36.7

lnrennt:<l.iate Goods

26.2

312

18.3

22.3

Capital Goods

17.l

16.3

12.6

16.2

Overall Economy

of which:

Source: Enterprise Coosulting Group Ltd. (ECG).
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TABLE 3
COVERAGE OF IMPORT PROHIBITION (TRADE) LIST, 1996

Agro-Allied Products

Industrial Products

Mineral Products

1.

Live or Dead Poultry
including eggs but
excluding day-old chicks

I.
2.
3.

Textile fabrics. an articles
Mosquito Repellent Coils
Domestic Plas tic ware

l.
2.

Gypsum
Kaolin

2.

Maize

4.

~ 1.Jl!ated/used Tyres

3.

Barytes and
BenLonites

3.

Sorghum

5.

Furniture and furniture products

4.

Millet

6.

Evian and similar waters.
and soft drinks

5.

Wheat Flour

7.

Beer and Stout

6.

Vegetable Oils

8.

7.

Barley and Malt

·9_

Motor vehicles and motor cycles
over 8 years old; and buses and
lorries over IO years old.
Gaming machines

TABLE 4:
EXPORT OF MAJOR COMODITlES BY ECONOMIC SECTORS
(PERCENTAGE OF TOT AL EXPORT VALUES), 1970-95
Commod11y

1970

1072

1973

1076

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1993

1994

1995

Major Agricultural
Producrs (including
FOl\.-st Producl<)

30.0

11.6

4.7

4.1

6.8

92.4

0.9

2.3

4.6

9.1

2.6

1.5

1.6

1.9

1.8

Cocoa

15.0

7.2

2.7

3.3

6.2

2.2

0.9

2.0

4.2

7.9

I. I

0.7

0.8

0.9

0.7

Pabn Kemcls

2.5

I.I

0.7

0.4

0.2

0.0

0.26

0.1

0. 1

0.3

1.0

0. 1

0. 1

0.1

0.0

Rubber

2.0

0.5

0.6

0.2

0.2

0. 1

0. 1

0.2

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.4

0.3

0.5

Mineral Producls

57.8

82.1

92.1\

9'.l.7

89.1

96.1

98.8

0.4

93.8

88.4

97.0

97.9

97.7

97.5

97.4

Petroleum

51.t\

81.8

92.6

93.7

89.1

96.1

98.8

97.3

93.8

88.4

97.0

97.9

97.7

97.4

97.3

3.0

0.b

0.b

0.4

0.5

0.2

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.2

0. 1

0.2

fapons

0.6

0.2

0.2

0.3

0.2

OJ

0.2

0.2

0.4

0.4

Other fapons

3.9

3.2

1.3

1.3

2.2

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.1

0.0

Maiufacturer,. and
Semi-Manufactures of
Agricultural Products
Other Manufactured

3.0
3.2

1.0

1.0

0

Note: 1. Provisional
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Reports (Various Issues)
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TABLES
NAIRA EXCHANGE RATES, 1970 - 1994

US Dollar/
Naira

Yea,

($/N)

1970

1.400

197 1

1.440

Perce111age
Change
Depr~ciation/
Appreciation)

pound

Percentage

Sterling/

Change
(Depn,ciat,011/
Appreciation)

na,ra
(t:/N)

0.584
2.9

0.583

-0. 17

1972

1.520

5.5

0.614

5.3

1973

J.520

0 .0

0.614

5.3

1974

1.589

4.5

0.676

0.0

1975

1.624

2.2

0.735

8.6

1976

1.596

-1.7

0 .884

20.4

1977

1.547

-3.l

0.1.m

-3. I

1978

1.575

I.~

(l.81 7

-4.6

1979

1.659

5.3

0.792

-3. 1
-0.3

1980

1.828

10.2

0.790

191!1

1.652

-9.6

0.800

1.3

1982

1.486

-JO. I

0.852

6 .5

0.892

4 .7

1983

1.332

-10.4

1984

1.303

-2.2

0.929

4.1

1985

1.121

-13.9

0.833

-10. 3

1986

0.577

--48.5

0.391

-53.1

1987

0 .252

-56.3

0.152

-61.1

-1 2.7

0.124

· 18.4

1988

0.220

1989

0.136

-38.2

0.083

-33.1

l~0

0.120

- 11.8

0.062

-25.3

1991

0. 101

-16.I

0.057

-8.1

1992

0.058

043.0

0.033

-42. l

1993

0.045

-22.4

0.030

-9.0

1994

0.046

+2.2

0.030

0.0

otes: In columns (3) and (5) a (-) sign represems depreciation while a ( + ) sign indicates apprecial ion.

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria. Statistical Bulletin and AMual Reports (Various Issues).

TABLE6
NIGERIA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS- SUMMARY STATEMENT, 1985-94 ($ MILLION)

CategOf)'

A.

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

CurTenl Account

2,470

Merchandise

5,615

-2,142

-74

-215

1,117.0

2.407.0

1.269.2

2,460

3 ,541

2.541

4,1 78

8,723

Exports (FOB)

13,134

6,460

·7.590

6,932

7,871

Oil

1993

1994

-294.0

-884.0

-2,230.0

4 ,500

4,682.4

3.268.5

2,870.9

13,67 1

12 ,264

1.886.I

9,924.4

9.415. 1
9,170.7

12,577

5,911

7,052

6,319

7,470

13,266

11,792

1.641.7

9 ,696.6

Non-Oil

551

538

538

613

401

406

472

244.4

227.8

244.4

Imports

-7,457

-3,912

-4,089

-4,391

3,693

-4,948

-1 ,155

7,203.7

-6,655.9

-6,541.1

Services and Income (Net)

-2,945

-4 ,430

•3,542

-2 ,841

-3,215

-3,608

-3,967

6,072.9

-4.790.0

-4.609.1

Unrequited Transfers (Net)

-260

- 172

-24

-12

-155

450

736

733.0

807.1

500.4

--227.0 • .448.83

-895.4

349.3

8.

Capital Acc0tJ!ll

-2.079

-1,834

-4,493

-4,407

-4.103

2 ,969.0

C.

Balance en CurTent
and Capital Acoount

+4,519

-3.976

-4,657

-4,622

-2,986

-562.0

1.496.2

5,742.3

- 1.779.0

- 1.880.7

D.

Ovemll Balance/Financing

+39 1

-3,976

-4,561

-4,662

-3.122

-717

1.594.3

5.862.9

-1.893. 1

-1,947.5

E.

Change in Reserves

-391

560

-40

+510

-1,185

-2.301

-601.2

3.774. 1

-617.5

-328.7

Source: CBN. Annual Reports (Various Issues).
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TABLE 7:
EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT OUTSTANDING (US. $ MILLION)

(Tl

r.
0

z

0

3::

;=j

Multilateral

Paris Club

LondonOub

Promissory Notes

Othen

TOTAL

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

884
(5.0)

1.097
(63)

1,317

1,887

(7.Q)

(7.4)

2,986
(910.50)

2,838
(9.2)

3,171
(10.0)

3,842
! 11.6)

3,650
( 10.9)

4,518.0
(16.4)

3.694.7
('12.9)

4.402.3
(6.68)

4.411.0
(7.39)

5,390
(30.3)

5,811
(335)

7,833
(41.4)

10228
(40.0)

12,589
(44.5)

14,400
(46.9)

15.871
(50.2)

17.171
(51.9)

17 .793
(53.3)

16,433.9
(60.0)

18,160.5
(158.1)

18.3343
(62.30)

21.669.6
(1.50)

6,263
(35.3)

4,966
(28.8)

3.560
(18.8)

6,088
(23.8)

5,860
(20.7)

5,960

5,680
(18.0)

5,861
(17.7)

5,988
( 17.9)

2.120.0

(19.4)

(1.1)

2.055.8
(13.97)

2,057.8
(14.30)

2.045.0
(15.93)

3,702
(20.8)

4,125
(23.80

4,255
(225)

4,498
(17.6)

4,850
(17.1)

43.8 IO
(15.70

4.553
(14.4)

4,550

4,479
(13.4)

3.2460

3.159.9

( 1'1 .8)

(909)

3.178.2
(.9.26)

3,148.0
(10.35)

(ll7)

1,526
(8.6)

1.318
(7.6)

1.939
(10.2)

2.873
(11.2)

2,032
(7.2)

2.685
(8.7)

2.3 11

1,675

(7.3)

(5 I)

1,454
(4.40

12,326.2
(45.0)

1.647.3
( 17.43)

I.456J
(201 1)

1,311.2
(24.85)

17,765

17.347

18904

25.574

28,316

30,693

31.586

33.099

~3.3654

27 .564.8

8,76181

29.428.9

32584.8

Notes: Figu res in Parenthesis are percentage shares whi le those above them are in million US Dollar,.
Source: CBN Annual Reports (Various Issues).
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TABLE 8:
DEBT SERVICING CAPACITY RATIOS

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

16.6

25.09

28.I

29.4

19.3

26.3

21.9

26.4

25.8

22.9

190.0

225.3

219.1

89.1

136.9

268.1

104.5

88.3

79.8

177.3

I.I

2.0

3.0

7.9

3.4

2.0

5.9

10.5

6.9

1.2

Debt Service to Govt.
Revenue(%)

23.9

36.8

37.0

40.5

39.4

56.3

52.7

78.2

109.6

64.0

Debt to GDP (%)

20.5

21.2

24.5

62.3

158.9

179.1

278.5

294.2

350.l

121.2

148.9

133.7

131.7

404.2

341.0

418.3

362.9

227.6

241.5

23 1.9

Debi Service Ratio 9%)

Debt Serv. to Ext. Reserves(%)
External Reserves to Imports
(in Months)

Debt to Exports (%)

Source: Compiled from statistics in C BN Annual Reports (Various Ye.ars)
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